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Abstract
We introduce the Berlin Numeracy Test, a new psychometrically sound instrument that quickly assesses statistical
numeracy and risk literacy. We present 21 studies (n=5336) showing robust psychometric discriminability across 15
countries (e.g., Germany, Pakistan, Japan, USA) and diverse samples (e.g., medical professionals, general populations,
Mechanical Turk web panels). Analyses demonstrate desirable patterns of convergent validity (e.g., numeracy, general
cognitive abilities), discriminant validity (e.g., personality, motivation), and criterion validity (e.g., numerical and non-
numerical questions about risk). The Berlin Numeracy Test was found to be the strongest predictor of comprehension
of everyday risks (e.g., evaluating claims about products and treatments; interpreting forecasts), doubling the predictive
power of other numeracy instruments and accounting for unique variance beyond other cognitive tests (e.g., cognitive
reflection, working memory, intelligence). The Berlin Numeracy Test typically takes about three minutes to complete
and is available in multiple languages and formats, including a computer adaptive test that automatically scores and
reports data to researchers (www.riskliteracy.org). The online forum also provides interactive content for public outreach
and education, and offers a recommendation system for test format selection. Discussion centers on construct validity
of numeracy for risk literacy, underlying cognitive mechanisms, and applications in adaptive decision support.
Keywords: risk literacy, statistical numeracy, individual differences, cognitive abilities, quantitative reasoning, decision
making, risky choice, adaptive testing, Mechanical Turk.
1 Introduction
Mathematics skills are among the most influential educa-
tional factors contributing to economic prosperity in in-
dustrialized countries (Hunt & Wittmann, 2008). Accord-
ingly, there has been considerable interest in the causes
and consequences of numeracy (Huff & Geis, 1954; Pau-
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los, 1988), which refers specifically to mathematical or
quantitative literacy (Steen, 1990). The more basic lev-
els of numeracy are concerned with the “real number
line, time, measurement, and estimation” whereas higher
levels focus on “an understanding of ratio concepts, no-
tably fractions, proportions, percentages, and probabili-
ties” (Reyna, Nelson, Ham, & Dieckman, 2009). Much
of the research on numeracy has involved assessment of a
wide range of mathematical skills among large and di-
verse samples. More recently, however, research and
theory in the decision sciences has focused on a sub-
set of numeracy that is important for informed and ac-
curate risky decision making—i.e., statistical numeracy
(Galesic, Garcia-Retamero & Gigerenzer, 2009; Lipkus,
Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Peters et al., 2006; Reyna et al.,
2009).
In this paper, we use “statistical numeracy” specifically
to refer to an understanding of the operations of prob-
abilistic and statistical computation, such as comparing
and transforming probabilities and proportions (Lipkus et
al., 2001; Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, & Welch, 1997).
These statistical aspects of numeracy are key features
of risk assessment in business and engineering (Ayyub,
2003; Covello & Mumpower, 1985; Froot, Scharfstein,
& Stein, 1993), and play central roles in health risk quan-
tification and communication (Lipkus & Peters, 2009;
see also Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz,
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Woloshin, 2007). Moreover—although risk commonly
refers to many topics (e.g., variability in probability dis-
tributions; the effect of uncertainty on objectives; expo-
sure to danger and loss; Figner & Weber, 2011; Fox &
Tennenbaum, 2011; Gigerenzer, Swijtink, Porter, Das-
ton, Beatty, Kruger, 1989)—economic and psychological
theory have long held that decision making under risk is
that involving known “statistical probabilities” and quan-
titative “probabilistic reasoning” (Knight, 1921; for a re-
cent review see Rakow, 2010).1 In these ways and others,
statistical numeracy is one factor that gives rise to risk
literacy—i.e., the ability to accurately interpret and act on
information about risk.2 Indeed, statistical numeracy has
been shown to be a predictor of decision strategies, af-
fective reactions, comprehension and normative choices
across many risky economic, health, and consumer deci-
sions (Banks, O’Dea, & Oldfield, 2010; Cokely & Kelley,
2009; Lipkus & Peters, 2009; Peters & Levin, 2008; Pe-
ters et al., 2006; Reyna et al., 2009).
Efforts to measure individual differences in statistical
numeracy and risk literacy come primarily in three forms.
Some research examines risky decisions in relation to
individual differences in overall educational attainment,
cognitive abilities, or cognitive styles (Frederick, 2005;
Stanovich & West, 2000, 2008). Other research primar-
ily focusing on clinical and health domains has devel-
oped a valid subjective instrument for self-reported esti-
mations of numeracy (Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 2010;
Zikmund-Fisher, Smith, Ubel, & Fagerlin, 2007). Most
common, however, is the use of objective performance
measures of numeracy—i.e., psychometric tests (for a
list of tests see Reyna et al., 2009; but see also Black,
Nease, & Tosteson, 1995; Galesic & Garcia-Retamero,
2010; Lipkus et al., 2001; Peters et al., 2006; Schwartz
et al., 1997; Weller, Dieckmann, Tusler, Mertz, Burns, &
Peters, 2011).
In this paper, we review the development of the most
widely used statistical numeracy instruments (Lipkus et
al., 2001; Schwartz et al., 1997), examining successes
and psychometric limits. We then introduce a new test
of statistical numeracy and risk literacy—i.e., the Berlin
Numeracy Test. The Berlin Numeracy Test can be used
in multiple formats (i.e., computer adaptive, paper-and-
pencil, multiple choice, single-item median-split), pro-
viding a fast, valid, and reliable tool for research, assess-
ment, and public outreach. Specifically, we show that the
new test offers unique predictive validity for comprehen-
1On Knight’s (1921) view, risk refers to known (objective) proba-
bilities whereas uncertainty refers to unknown, subjective or indeter-
minable probabilities. For a related quantification of risk that is more
inclusive of both uncertainty and other decision making trade-offs re-
lated to risk management see Kaplan and Garrack (1981).
2Risk literacy should not be confused with risk awareness or risk
knowledge, which refer more specifically to one’s awareness of “facts”
about risks (e.g., being aware that flying is safer than driving).
sion of everyday risks beyond other cognitive ability and
numeracy tests (e.g., cognitive reflection, working mem-
ory span, and fluid intelligence). Furthermore, we show
that the Berlin Numeracy Test dramatically improves psy-
chometric discriminability among highly-educated indi-
viduals (e.g., college students and graduates, medical
professionals), across diverse cultures and different lan-
guages. We close with a discussion of construct validity,
underlying mechanisms, and applications (e.g., custom-
tailored, interactive, and adaptive risk communication).
1.1 Numeracy and risk literacy in educated
samples
In 2001, Lipkus et al. (2001) published the numeracy test
for highly-educated samples, as an extension of previous
work by Schwartz et al. (1997). Lipkus et al. (2001) con-
ducted a series of 4 studies (n = 463) on community sam-
ples of well-educated adult participants (at least 40 years
of age) in North Carolina. Among other tasks, all par-
ticipants answered 11 total numeracy questions includ-
ing (i) one practice question, (ii) three numeracy ques-
tions taken from the work of Schwartz et al. (1997), and
(iii) seven other questions (one of which had two parts)
that were framed in the health domain (e.g., if the chance
of getting a disease is 10% how many people would be
expected to get the disease: (a) out of 100, (b) out of
1000). Two questions had multiple choice options while
all others were open-ended. All questions were scored
(0 or 1) with data aggregated across several studies and
entered into a factor analysis, showing that a one factor
solution was appropriate. Overall, results indicated that
the refined test by Lipkus et al. (2001) was a reliable and
internally consistent measure of high-school and college
educated individuals’ statistical numeracy.
The results of Lipkus et al. (2001) were interesting for
a number of reasons. First, the results provided additional
evidence that even among educated US community sam-
ples some sizable proportion of individuals were likely
to be statistically innumerate (e.g., 20% failed questions
dealing with risk magnitude). Such findings were and
continue to be important as many efforts designed to sup-
port informed and shared decision making rest on an er-
roneous assumption that decision-makers are numerate
(or at least sufficiently statistically numerate; see also
Guadagnoli & Ward P, 1998; Schwartz et al., 1997). Sec-
ond, results indicated that domain framing (e.g., medical
versus financial versus abstract gambles) did not neces-
sary differentially affect test performance or comprehen-
sion. This finding indicates that various domain-specific
items (e.g., items framed in terms of financial or med-
ical or gambling risks) can provide a reasonable basis
for the assessment of general statistical numeracy skills
that will have predictive power across diverse domains.
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Overall, for nearly a decade, the Lipkus et al. (2001) test,
and its predecessor from Schwartz et al. (1997) have pro-
vided relatively short, reliable, and valuable instruments
that have been used in more than 100 studies on topics
such as medical decision making, shared decision mak-
ing, trust, patient education, sexual behavior, stock eval-
uations, credit-card usage, graphical communication, and
insurance decisions, among many others (Lipkus & Pe-
ters, 2009).
1.2 Psychometrics
Despite its many successes and its influential role in ad-
vancing risky decision research, as anticipated by Lip-
kus et al. (2001), a growing body of data suggests some
ways the current numeracy instrument could be improved
(for an item response theory based analysis see Schapira,
Walker, & Sedivy, 2009; see also Weller et al. 2011).
For example, one major concern is that the Lipkus et al.
test is not hard enough to adequately differentiate among
the higher-performing, highly-educated individuals who
are often studied (e.g., convenience samples from univer-
sities). To illustrate, in one study of college students at
the Florida State University, data indicated that, although
the Lipkus et al. (2001) test was a significant predictor
of risky decisions, the Lipkus et al. test showed extensive
negative skew with scores approaching the measurement
ceiling (e.g., most participants answered more than 80%
of items correctly; Cokely & Kelley, 2009; for similar re-
sults see Peters et al., 2006, 2007a, 2008; Schapira et al.,
2009; and for similar patterns from physicians-in-training
see Hanoch, Miron-Shatz, Cole, Himmelstein, & Feder-
man, 2010). Another recent study using large probabilis-
tically representative samples of the whole populations of
two countries (the United States and Germany) revealed
negative skew in numeracy scores even among partic-
ipants from the general population (Galesic & Garcia-
Retamero, 2010). Although most people are not college
educated, most people in these two countries are likely
to get the majority of questions right. These data sug-
gest that most individuals tend to produce distributions of
scores that are negatively skewed and are subject to mea-
surement ceiling effects.
A second psychometric concern is that there is rel-
atively little known about the relations between either
the Lipkus et al. (2001) or Schwartz et al. (1997) nu-
meracy test and other individual differences, such as ba-
sic cognitive abilities (Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, &
Pardo, 2011). To illustrate, one might argue that statisti-
cal numeracy is a useful predictor of risky choice sim-
ply because it is correlated with measures of fluid in-
telligence. It is well known that tests of general intel-
ligence, including those designed to measure fluid in-
telligence, are valid and reliable predictors of a wide
variety of socially desirable cognitive, behavioral, oc-
cupational, and health-related outcomes (Neisser et al.,
1996).3 Fluid intelligence tests such as Raven’s Stan-
dard or Advanced Progressive Matrices tend to be more
time consuming yet also confer considerable benefits in
terms of psychometric rigor and cross-cultural fairness
(Raven, 2000). To date, however, few tests have inves-
tigated the extent to which the Lipkus et al. (2001) or
Schwartz et al. (1997) instruments provide unique pre-
dictive power beyond other cognitive ability instruments
either within or across cultures (Cokely & Kelley, 2009;
Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 2010; Garcia-Retamero &
Galesic, 2010a, 2010b; Liberali et al., 2011; Okan,
Garcia-Retamero, Cokely, & Maldonado, in press).
A third psychometric issue is that, even if numer-
acy is compared with other abilities, the observed mea-
surement skew and ceiling effects will complicate com-
parative evaluations (e.g., intelligence v. statistical nu-
meracy). Consider a recent study designed to investi-
gate the extent to which each of several individual dif-
ferences (e.g., executive functioning, cognitive impulsiv-
ity, numeracy) influenced decision-making competence
(Del Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 2011; but see
also 2010). The study found that numeracy was less re-
lated to some decision-making competencies than were
measures of executive functioning or cognitive impulsiv-
ity, measured by the cognitive reflection test (Frederick,
2005). It is however possible that, at least in part, some
measurement ceiling effects in numeracy scores among
the college student sample could have limited differenti-
ation of those individuals with the highest levels of nu-
meracy. In contrast, both executive functioning and the
cognitive reflection tests are known to provide discrim-
ination even among highly-educated individuals. To be
clear, our reading of the individual differences study by
Del Missier et al. (2011) is that it represents precise and
careful research using many of the best available meth-
ods and tools. However, the potential psychometric limits
inherent in the now decade old numeracy test leave open
important questions. To the extent that a numeracy instru-
ment does not adequately or accurately estimate variation
in the sub-populations of interest it is not an efficient ba-
sis for theory development or policy evaluations.
2 Test development and validation
Building on the work of Lipkus et al. (2001) and
Schwartz et al. (1997) we aimed to develop a new psy-
chometrically sound statistical numeracy test that could
3The underlying cognitive mechanisms that give rise to these effects
are debated and remain unclear (Cokely, Kelley, & Gichrist, 2006; Eric-
sson, Prietula, & Cokely, 2007; Fox, Roring, & Mitchum, 2009; Neisser
et al., 1996)
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be used with educated and high-ability samples.4 Our
goal was not to develop a high-fidelity comprehensive
test of statistical numeracy or of its sub-skills. Rather,
the goal was to develop a brief, valid, and easy-to-use in-
strument, with improved discriminability. Development
of the Berlin Numeracy Test began with pre-testing on a
pool of items including all items from both the Lipkus
et al. (2001) and Schwartz et al. (1997) tests along with
other items that were internally generated. Following
a protocol analysis in which participants solved all nu-
meracy problems while thinking aloud (Barton, Cokely,
Galesic, Koehler, & Haas, 2009; see also Fox, Ericsson,
& Best, 2011), we analyzed responses and selected 28
candidate questions for inclusion in the next stage of test
development (i.e., 12 original items plus 16 new items).
2.1 Participants
We tested a community sample of 300 participants (57%
women) from Berlin, Germany at the Max Planck Insti-
tute for Human Development. Participants were primar-
ily current or former undergraduate or graduate students
from the Humboldt, Free, and Technical Universities of
Berlin. The mean participant age was approximately 26
years old (i.e., 25.86, SD=3.98; range=18–44). Each par-
ticipant completed about six hours of testing over the
course of two to three weeks in exchange for 40 euro (ca.
$55).
2.2 Materials and procedure
A number of different instruments were used to provide
convergent, discriminant, and criterion (predictive) valid-
ity for the Berlin Numeracy Test. All comparative instru-
ments are listed and described in Table 1. Participants
were tested in three separate phases. In phase 1, all partic-
ipants were tested individually via computer and/or with
the assistance of a laboratory technician as required by
the particular instrument. The first testing session lasted
for approximately two hours and consisted primary of
cognitive ability instruments and cognitive performance
tasks, including assessment of all candidate numeracy
items. Note that participants only answered each candi-
date numeracy question once. During this session calcu-
lators were not allowed; however, participants were pro-
vided with paper and pens/pencils for notes. In phase 2,
participants completed an online assessment from their
home including a variety of self-report personality and
4The Berlin Numeracy Test is named to reflect the international, in-
terdisciplinary development effort initiated in 2007 in the Center for
Adaptive Behavior and Cognition at the Max Planck Institute for Hu-
man Development. For additional discussion and similar public out-
reach efforts concerning expertise, ethics and philosophical judgment
see philosophicalcharacter.org (Feltz & Cokely, 2009, in press; Schulz,
Cokely, & Feltz, 2011).
other survey instruments. All participants agreed to com-
plete the online portion of the study in one session in
which they sat alone, in a quiet room. In phase 3, partic-
ipants returned about two weeks after their first session
and completed another two hours of testing. All partici-
pants were again tested individually via computer and/or
with the assistance of a laboratory technician as required
by the particular instrument/task. The final two hours of
testing involved new cognitive performance tasks includ-
ing a battery of everyday risky decision-making compre-
hension questions that served as a means of assessing pre-
dictive validity (Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, submitted;
Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, in press).
2.3 Test construction and test items
Performance quartiles for all participants were assessed
according to performance on all 28 candidate statistical
numeracy questions (i.e., 12 questions from the Lipkus
et al., 2001 set, plus 16 new questions). A subset of
five questions with a 4-level tree structure was identi-
fied using the categorization tree application from the
predictive modeling and forecasting software DTREG
(Sherrod, 2003). The tree structure was constructed
such that participants arriving at each branch of the tree
had approximately a 50% probably of answering cor-
rectly/incorrectly. The test’s tree structure was subjected
to cross-validation and showed less than 10% misclassifi-
cation.5 Subsequent analyses indicated that reducing the
4-level solution to a simpler 3-level solution (i.e., remov-
ing one problem) did not affect test classification perfor-
mance or validity yet reduced test-taking time (i.e., 10%
reduction), increased test format flexibility (i.e., simpli-
fied paper-and-pencil format scoring), and provided im-
proved discriminability among new samples (see “cross-
cultural discriminability” below). All final Berlin Nu-
meracy Test formats are based on the four questions used
for the optimal 3-level categorization tree as follows (an-
swers provided in each blank):
1. Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are mem-
bers of a choir. Out of these 500 members in the choir
100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in
the choir 300 are men. What is the probability that a
randomly drawn man is a member of the choir? Please
indicate the probability in percent. ___25%___
2a. Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times.
On average, out of these 50 throws how many times
would this five-sided die show an odd number (1, 3 or
5)? __30__ out of 50 throws.
5Although some misclassification is unavoidable, the algorithm
rarely misclassified a participant by more than one quartile. The as-
sessment is similar to an item response theory analysis in that it identi-
fies items with high levels of discriminability across the range of item
difficulty with a guessing parameter of zero.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 2012 Berlin Numeracy Test 29




















A multi-item performance measure of one’s ability to control attention





A five item battery involving interpretation of information about risks in





A 13 item scale measuring one’s tendency to maximize v. satisfice during
decision making.
Schwartz et al. (2002)
Persistence The Grit-S is an eight item brief measure designed to assess persistence





The AMS-R is a 10 item trait assessment of one’s general achievement
motivation (e.g., one’s desire to achieve good grades or performance
evaluations).
Lang and Fries (2006)
Self efficacy A10 item self-report measure of one’s general sense of self efficacy. Schwarzer and
Jerusalem (1995)
Personality A 10 item assessment of the Big Five personality traits. Gosling, Rentfrow,
and Swann (2003)
Test Anxiety The TAI-G is a 20 item assessment of test-taking anxiety. Hodapp and Benson
(1997)
Implicit theories A four item measurement of the extent to which one believes intelligence










2b. Imagine we are throwing a loaded die (6 sides).
The probability that the die shows a 6 is twice as high as
the probability of each of the other numbers. On average,
out of these 70 throws how many times would the die
show the number 6? ___20___out of 70 throws.
3. In a forest 20% of mushrooms are red, 50% brown
and 30% white. A red mushroom is poisonous with a
probability of 20%. A mushroom that is not red is poi-
sonous with a probability of 5%. What is the proba-
bility that a poisonous mushroom in the forest is red?
___50%___
2.4 Test formats and scoring
Different research environments have different con-
straints such as computer-access, group-testing options,
data-security requirements, etc. Accordingly, we de-
signed the test to be flexible, offering multiple formats
(for the multiple choice test see the “A Multiple Choice
Format” section). A test format recommendation system
is available online at www.riskliteracy.org. This system
asks 1–4 questions (e.g., how much time is available for
testing; what type of sample will you test) in order to
recommend appropriate formats and provide sample ma-
terials.
2.4.1 Computer adaptive test format
In this format, 2–3 questions (of 4 possible questions) are
asked to participants (Appendix II). Questions are adap-
tively selected based on participants’ past success in an-
swering previous questions (see Figure 1 for test struc-
ture). The adaptive structure means that all questions
have about a 50% probability of being answered correctly
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Range of possible scores 0–3 0–11 1–4 0–4 0–1
Range of achieved scores 0–3 5–11 1–4 0–4 0–1
Average score
Mean 2.4 9.7 2.6 1.6 .52
Median 3 10 3 2 1
Standard deviation .82 1.38 1.13 1.21 .50
Length
Number of items 3 11 2–3 4 1
Mean duration in minutes 1.2 4.5 2.6 4.3 1.1
Reliability
Cronbach’s alpha .52 .54 –a .59 –a
Discriminability
Item % correct (mean) .82 .89 –b .41 .52
Mean score of
1st quartile 0.8 7.3 1.0 0.0 0.0
2nd quartile 2.0 9.0 2.0 1.0
3rd quartile 3.0 10.0 3.0 2.0 1.0
4th quartile 3.0 11.0 4.0 3.3
aCronbach’s alpha cannot be computed. Principal component analysis indicates that the four items used in
Berlin Numeracy Test all loaded highly on a single factor explaining 45% of variance.
bApproximately 50%, conditional on previous responses.
with subsequent questions adjusted on the basis of partic-
ipants’ prior answers. If an answer is correct/incorrect
then a harder/easier question is automatically provided.
A participant’s skill-level can then be determined from
answers to 2–3 questions in roughly half the time nor-
mally required for the Lipkus et al. (2001) numeracy
test (less than three minutes; see Table 2). To facili-
tate access, the computer adaptive Berlin Numeracy Test
is available online in a format that automatically scores
participants’ responses and reports data to researchers in
terms of estimated participant quartile scores. Scores
are typically batched such that the researcher requests a
certain number of test scores and when that number is
reached the full results are emailed. The test can be found
at www.riskliteracy.org, which also provides access via
other internet ready devices (e.g., smart phones). The
online forum allows the public to complete the test and
receive feedback on their performance relative to others,
along with information about potential challenges they
may face when making risky decisions. However, be-
fore completing any online test items, the adaptive test
seamlessly redirects participants to a secure online server.
All Berlin Numeracy Test data collection is managed and
hosted via the Unipark survey software system designed
for academic research (www.unipark.de). We request that
researchers use the computer adaptive test format when-
ever possible as this format provides an efficient balance
between speed and psychometric accuracy, and also al-
lows us to continue to collect data that can be used to
further refine the test.
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Figure 1: The structure of the Computer Adaptive Berlin
Numeracy Test. Each question has a 50% probably of
being right/wrong. If a question is answered right/wrong
a harder/easier question is provided that again has a 50%
probability of being right/wrong.
Question 1
Question 2a Question 2b
Question 3
1 2 3 4
2.4.2 Traditional (paper and pencil) format
The alternative, traditional format (Appendix III) requires
that participants answer all four questions from the Berlin
Numeracy Test in sequence. Scoring involves totaling all
correct answers (i.e., 0–4 points possible). In this format
the structure of the adaptive test is ignored, although the
adaptive scoring algorithm can be applied following data
collection as might be useful (e.g., to estimate quartiles
compared to available norms for college educated sam-
ples). This alternative (traditional) format may be use-
ful when computerized testing is impractical, such as in
group testing or when computer access is limited. Testing
requires about as long as the original Lipkus et al. (2001)
numeracy test (i.e., less than 5 minutes).
2.4.3 Single-item (median) format
In cases where time is extremely limited, it is possible to
use only the first item of the test (question 1) as a means
of estimating median splits (Appendix IV). Those who
answer the question right are estimated to belong to the
top half of educated participants while all others are as-
signed the bottom half. Given the relatively small time
savings over the adaptive format we recommend this op-
tion be avoided in favor of the computer adaptive ver-
sion whenever practical. Generally, this test format takes
about as long as the Schwartz et al. (1997) instrument
(i.e., about 1 minute).
2.5 Results and discussion: Psychometric
properties
Results of psychometric analyses are presented in Tables
2–4. Three formats of the Berlin Numeracy Test—i.e.,
Computer Adaptive, Traditional Paper and Pencil, and
Single Item—are compared with the standard numeracy
test by Lipkus et al. (2001) as well as with the brief three
item test by Schwartz et al. (1997).
2.5.1 Basic attributes
In our educated sample, scores on the Lipkus et al. (2001)
numeracy scale show dramatic negative skew (Table 2).
Although possible scores range from 0 to 11, the lowest
observed score was 5 (45% correct). Both the mean and
median are close to the measurement ceiling (i.e., 88%
and 91% correct, respectively). Similar levels of skew
are observed for the Schwartz et al. (1997) test. In con-
trast, scores on the Berlin Numeracy Test are distributed
evenly across the whole range of possible scores regard-
less of format. Estimates of internal consistency for the
Berlin Numeracy Test show some modest improvement
over other existing numeracy tests. However, as is com-
mon for very short tests, the Cronbach’s alpha level of all
numeracy tests was below the typical .7 aspiration level.6
A principal axis factor analysis of the four items from
the Berlin Numeracy Test indicated that all items loaded
highly on a single factor explaining 45% of the observed
variance. An additional study at Michigan Technological
University found that, when the test was taken two dif-
ferent times, five days apart, it showed high levels of test-
retest reliability, r(11)=.91, p=.001. All Berlin Numeracy
Test formats also typically take less time to complete than
the Lipkus et al. (2001) numeracy test.
2.5.2 Convergent and discriminant validity
If the Berlin Numeracy Test is successful in assessing lev-
els of statistical numeracy, it should correlate with other
numeracy tests and with measures of cognitive ability
(i.e., convergent validity). Moreover, to the extent the
Berlin Numeracy Test primarily measures statistical nu-
meracy it should not correlate with essentially unrelated
constructs, such as motivation, personality, beliefs, or at-
titudes (i.e., discriminant validity). As Table 3 shows,
both requirements—high correlations with related con-
structs and low with unrelated constructs—are satisfied
for all three forms of Berlin Numeracy Test.7
6For comparison, the 3 item Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick,
2005) had a Cronbach’s alpha =.62 and a mean duration 2.5 minutes.
7For comparison, the correlation of the Cognitive Reflection Test
(Frederick, 2005) with Raven’s Adv. Matrices was .40, with Vocabulary
.28, and with Working Memory Span .26. Correlation with Extraversion
was –.14, with Openness to experience –.23, and with Text Anxiety –
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Lipkus et al. 11 items .75**
BNT: Computer Adaptive .45** .49**
BNT: Paper and Pencil .50** .50** .91**
BNT: Single Item .39** .42** .90** .75**
Cognitive abilities/styles
Raven’s Adv. Matrices .41** .37** .48** .53** .41**
Cognitive Reflection Test .40** .41** .51** .56** .41**
Vocabulary Spot-a-word .25** .21** .24** .25** .22**
Working memory span .14* .11 .21** .20** .16**
Discriminant validity
Motivation measures
Maximizing-Satisficing .01 .04 .05 .04 .05
Persistence (Grit-S) .02. .03 –.05 –.07 –.03
Achievement motivation –.08 –.10 –.02 .00 –.01
Self-efficacy .00 –.01 –.01 .02 .03
Personality Traits
Emotional stability –.10 –.05 .01 .05 –.02
Conscientiousness –.09 –.04 –.09 –.08 –.06
Agreeableness –.03 –.07 –.14* –.08 –.17**
Extraversion –.07 –.06 –.05 –.05 –.06
Openness to experience –.14* –.16** –.18** –.14* –.16**
Other measures
Test anxiety –.15* –.16* –.12 –.16* –.09
Implicit theories –.15* –.13** –.07 –.10* –.04
Satisfaction with life .14* .08 .12 .16 .07
*p=.05; **p<.01.
2.5.3 Predictive validity
One of the intended purposes of the Berlin Numeracy
Test is predicting people’s understanding of information
about risk in consumer, medical, and everyday contexts—
i.e., predicting risk literacy. To investigate the predictive
.13. Correlations with other variables were not significant.
validity of the Berlin Numeracy Test, we administered
a short battery of items dealing with information about
everyday risks related to common consumer, health, and
medical choices (e.g., evaluating the efficacy of tooth-
pastes and cancer screenings), as well as information
about probabilities typically used in weather forecasts
(Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, in press; see Appendix for
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Mean proportion correct answers on understanding of everyday risks, by test quartiles
1st quartile .72 .68 .68 .66 .70
2nd quartile .74 .66 .70 .70
3rd quartile .78 .78 .74 .78 .78
4th quartile .78 .78 .84 .84
Predictive validity for correct answers on understanding of everyday risks (standardized beta coefficients)
As a single predictor .20** .20** .29** .34** .25**
With Raven .14* .15* .24** .31** .19**
With CRT .09 .08 .17** .23** .14*
* p<.05; **p<.01
examples). Table 4 shows correlations of different nu-
meracy tests with the overall accuracy of interpretations
of these items. All formats of the Berlin Numeracy Test
were superior to the previous numeracy tests. Both the
Computer Adaptive test and the Paper and Pencil format
doubled the predictive resolution of the previous tests.
When either of these formats was included in the model
the previous numeracy tests lost all of their unique pre-
dictive power. We next investigated the extent to which
the Berlin Numeracy Test explained additional variance
in risk understanding controlling for the strongest alter-
native predictors of performance—i.e., fluid intelligence
and cognitive reflection. As Table 4 shows, all formats of
the Berlin Numeracy Test explain a substantial portion of
additional variance after these others tests are included in
a hierarchical regression model.8 In contrast, both previ-
ous numeracy tests lose most (or all) of their predictive
power when intelligence or cognitive reflection tests are
included. Overall, results indicate that the Berlin Numer-
acy Test is a reliable and valid test of statistical numeracy
and risk literacy, offering higher levels of discriminabil-
ity and overcoming the major psychometric limitations
of the Lipkus et al. (2001) test and Schwartz et al. (1997)
tests.
8For comparison, risk comprehension was predicted by the Cogni-
tive Reflection Test with a standardized beta of .31 and by the Raven’s
test with a standardized beta of .20. When controlling for the Berlin
Numeracy Test, the cognitive reflection test continued to predict unique
variance .20, but Raven’s test did not .05. See the general discussion for
a theoretical account of these differences.
3 Additional validation studies
3.1 Cross-cultural discriminability
The initial validation of the Berlin Numeracy Test was
completed on a sample of highly-educated people living
in a major metropolitan city in Germany. As a means of
out-of-sample validation, we sought to assess the extent
to which test discriminability generalized to other highly-
educated samples from different cultures, presented in
different languages. Specifically, we examined test per-
formance in studies conducted in 15 different countries
with diverse cultural backgrounds. Studies were con-
ducted by different research groups, examining college
student samples at research-active universities, primar-
ily testing participants from introduction to psychology
participant pools. Studies were conducted in China (Ts-
inghua University), England (University College Lon-
don), France (Universite de Lausanne), Germany (Max
Planck Institute for Human Development), India (Tha-
par University), Japan (University of Tokyo), the Nether-
lands (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven), Norway (Univer-
sity of Oslo),9 Pakistan (University of Punjab), Poland
(Wroclaw University), Portugal (University of Porto),10
9Data collection in Norway used the traditional 4 item rather than
adaptive form of the Berlin Numeracy Test. Data reported in the table
are calculated using the adaptive scoring algorithm, which was highly
correlated with overall score, r(154)=.90. In the standard format the
average score was 62% correct showing modest skew (–.29).
10Data collection in Portugal used a modified Berlin Numeracy Test.
Data were only available for the single item test and are not presented
in the table. Overall 46.4% of participants (n = 306) from Portugal
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Table 5: Proportion of participants in each quartile from 14 countries. Quartile scores are estimated based on the
computer adaptive test algorithm. Countries are ordered by their percentage of top quartile scores. See footnote 8 for
data from Portugal.
Country Language N 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile Top quartile
China English 166 .04 .07 .14 .75
Poland Polish 205 .14 .20 .22 .44
England English 420 .20 .31 .14 .35
Japan Japanese 63 .06 .36 .24 .34
Sweden Swedish 47 .21 .28 .17 .34
France French 86 .30 .13 .23 .34
USA English 55 .20 .29 .20 .31
Switzerland German 503 .26 .23 .23 .28
Germany German 173 .29 .21 .22 .28
Norway Norwegian 156 .25 .24 .25 .26
Belgium Dutch 50 .30 .30 .16 .24
India English 83 .19 .52 .08 .21
Pakistan English 114 .29 .41 .19 .11
Spain Spanish 258 .48 .41 .07 .04
Total 2,379 .23 .28 .18 .31
Spain (University of Granada), Sweden (Uppsala Univer-
sity), Switzerland (University of Basel), and the United
States (Michigan Technological University).11 In total,
additional data from n=2685 college students was exam-
ined. All reported data are scored via the adaptive Berlin
Numeracy Test algorithm, where 2–3 questions (out of
4) are used to estimate statistical numeracy quartiles for
each participant.12
Overall results show the test generally discriminated
within desirable tolerances (i.e., pm 10%) for each quar-
tile (Table 5). Aggregating across samples, the mean test
score was 51.7% correct, which closely approximated the
ideal score of 50%. This score indicates that on average
the first test item of the Berlin Numeracy Test achieved
the intended 50% discriminability. We also observed
some modest underestimation of the third quartile and
commensurate overestimation in the top quartile. In part,
higher top quartile scores may reflect the fact that sev-
eral of our samples were collected from elite universi-
ties and selective technical/engineering universities (e.g.,
University College London; Tsinghua University). Vi-
answered the first question right (theoretical ideal test score = 50%).
11We thank Nicolai Bodemer, Siegfried Dewitte, Stefan Herzog, Mar-
cus Lindskog, Hitashi Lomash, Yasmina Okan, Jing Qian, Samantha Si-
mon, Helena Szrek, Masanori Takezawa, Karl Teigen, Jan Woike, and
Tomek Wysocki for assistance with cross cultural data collection.
12Translation involved iterative cycles of back-translation with revi-
sion.
sual inspection shows some specific positive and nega-
tive skewing of scores across various countries.13 For
example, Spain, Pakistan, and India all show moderate
positive skew. In contrast, the highest performing sam-
ple, which was collected in China, showed very strong
negative skew. Taken together, aggregated scores closely
approximated the intended quartiles. The observed distri-
butions indicate that with only 2–3 statistical numeracy
questions the Berlin Numeracy Test achieves good dis-
criminability across most countries even when presented
in different languages or when used at elite or technolog-
ical universities.
3.2 Physician assistants
One goal for the Berlin Numeracy Test is to offer an in-
strument that can quickly assess statistical numeracy and
risk literacy in highly-trained professionals. Of particu-
lar interest are those professionals who commonly make
risky decisions and communicate risks. One such group
in the United States is physician assistants. Physician as-
sistants are independently licensed medical profession-
als who work under the supervision of physicians in all
medical subspecialties (e.g., emergency medicine, family
practice, surgery). Physician assistants independently di-
13The Berlin Numeracy Test estimates quartiles, so caution is re-
quired when interpreting standard assessments of skew.
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Table 6: Percentage of people in each quartile from three different samples estimated by the computer adaptive Berlin
Numeracy Test algorithm.
Sample N 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Graduating US Physician Assistants 51 .16 .39 .29 .16
Population Sample in Sweden 213 .20 .36 .24 .20
USA Web Panel Sample (M-Turk) 1,612 .49 .27 .12 .13
Total 1,876 .28 .34 .22 .16
agnose and treat patients, and provide care similar to that
provided by a physician, with professional training typi-
cally involving two or three years of post graduate study
and clinical rotations.
Previous studies of physicians-in-training in the UK
(Hanoch et al., 2010) revealed dramatic skew in re-
sponses to the Lipkus et al. (2001) test. Specifically, in
one sample of physicians-in-training, Hanoch and col-
leagues found that the average Lipkus et al. test score
was 95% correct, with 64% of participants answering all
questions correctly. Here, we assessed performance of
the Berlin Numeracy Test by administering a paper and
pencil format to a group of physician assistant students (n
= 51) who were completing their final semester of train-
ing at the University of Oklahoma.14 Results revealed
slight positive skew (.16) suggesting the test was well cal-
ibrated, if somewhat difficult. A similar distribution was
observed when the adaptive scoring algorithm was ap-
plied (Table 6). The mean adaptive test score was 44.3%
correct, which reasonably approximated the ideal score of
50%. Note that, in contrast to other highly-educated sam-
ples, these data show some central clustering of scores.
To the extent this pattern generalizes it suggests physi-
cian assistants are less likely to have very low levels of
statistical numeracy, as would be expected. Overall, re-
sults indicate that the Berlin Numeracy Test is well suited
for use with these and other highly-educated profession-
als who are often charged with interpreting and commu-
nicating risks. Ongoing research is assessing test perfor-
mance among other diverse professional groups (e.g., di-
eticians, financial advisors, judges, lawyers, physicians,
professional athletes, and poker players).
3.3 Numeracy in the general population:
Data from Sweden
The Berlin Numeracy Test was designed to estimate
differences in risk literacy among educated individuals.
Considering the observed skew in scores from the Lip-
kus et al., (2001) test, the Berlin Numeracy Test may also
be suitable for use among general, non-highly educated
14We thank Robert Hamm for data collection.
populations. As part of a larger validation and transla-
tion study, data were collected from a quota sample of
adults living in the Uppsala area of Sweden (ages 20–
60) who were matched against the known population on
age and gender (Lindskog, Kerimi, Winman, & Juslin,
2011).15 Approximately 370 of 2000 potential partici-
pants responded to a request for participation, of which
213 were selected for testing in the current study. Of the
213 participants included in this sample approximately
30% had only high-school education with 20% complet-
ing a masters degree or higher. The test was presented in
Swedish and was administered using the adaptive format.
Results show the average test score was 48.8% correct,
which closely approximated the theoretically ideal score
of 50%. Distributions of estimated quartiles were some-
what concentrated around the middle quartiles, particu-
larly quartile two (Table 6).
In addition to the Berlin Numeracy Data, data were
also collected for the Lipkus et al., (2001) test. As ex-
pected, results showed marked skew in scores with an
average score of 83.5% correct and clear negative skew
(-1.94). We next compared these Lipkus et al. test scores
with other data from previous studies that had been col-
lected using probabilistic, representative sampling in the
USA and Germany (Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 2010).
Results indicate that this sample of Swedish residents’
scores showed considerably more negative skew reflect-
ing significantly higher levels of statistical numeracy
compared to the populations in Germany, t (1209)=9.29,
p = .001 (skewness = –.55), or the USA, t (1375) = 13.51,
p = .001, (skewness = –.33).
Overall, results indicate that the Berlin Numeracy Test
is well suited for estimating numeracy among some seg-
ments of the general population of Sweden or other sim-
ilar community samples. However, because the current
sample from Sweden is more numerate than that of ei-
ther the USA or Germany, we can expect some positive
skew in representative samples of the general population
from the US, Germany, or other similar countries. Ac-
cordingly, when assessing statistical numeracy in repre-
15This research was financed by the Swedish Research Council. We
thank Marcus Lindskog and colleagues for sharing these data.
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sentative samples of the general population we suggest
including at least one other test in addition to the Berlin
Numeracy Test (e.g., Weller et al., 2011). One promising
strategy that adds only about 1 minute in testing time is
to combine the three item Schwartz et al. (1997) test with
the Berlin Numeracy Test (for an example see the next
section on web panel data). Ongoing studies are examin-
ing this strategy in representative samples of residents of
the USA.
3.4 United States web panel data from Me-
chanical Turk
Behavioral scientists are increasingly using paid web
panels for data collection and hypothesis testing. One
popular option for data collection is Amazon.com’s Me-
chanical Turk Web Panel (for a review see Paolacci,
Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). The first published study
to assess numeracy among participants from Mechani-
cal Turk was published in 2010 (Paolacci et al., 2010).
In this study, Paolacci and colleagues assessed numer-
acy using the subjective numeracy scale (Fagerlin et al.,
2007), which is known to correlate with the objective
Lipkus et al. (2001) test (Paolacci et al., 2010). Results
revealed an average subjective numeracy score of 4.35
(67% of maximum), which is similar to previously re-
ported scores (e.g., participants recruited from a univer-
sity hospital showed a modest skew (–.3); see Fagerlin
et al., 2007). Similarly, we recently investigated numer-
acy using the Schwartz et al., (1997) test on a conve-
nience sample from Mechanical Turk (n =250) (Okan,
Garcia-Retamero, Galesic, & Cokely, in press). Consis-
tent with results from the subjective numeracy test, re-
sults revealed moderate negative skew (-1.2), indicating
an average score of 2.11 (i.e., 70% correct). A total of
42% of the sample also answered 100% of the questions
correct.
To evaluate the performance of web panelists on the
Berlin Numeracy Test we administered an adaptive test
to a large Mechanical Turk web panel sample (n=1612).
All reported data were scored via the adaptive algorithm,
where 2–3 questions (out of 4) were used to estimate sta-
tistical numeracy quartiles for each participant. As an-
ticipated, we observed positive skew (.90) in the sample
scores indicating that the test was moderately difficult.16
In the previous web panel studies we observed posi-
tive and negative skew for the Berlin Numeracy Test and
the Schwartz et al. (1997) test, respectively. It stands
to reason that combining the two tests would yield a
better distribution, providing increased discriminability.
Therefore, we conducted a new study including both the
16To the extent our data generalize, results suggest that our single
question 2a may allow for a rough approximation of a median split
among Mechanical Turk participants.
Schwartz et al. test and the Berlin Numeracy Test with
participants on Mechanical Turk (n=206). When scored
separately, we replicated the negative (–.62) and positive
(.48) skewing of scores on the two tests. However, sim-
ply adding the two scores together yielded a normal dis-
tribution with no evidence of skew (–.016). In summary,
results suggest that combining the Berlin Numeracy Test
with the Schwartz et al. test provides a very fast assess-
ment (< 4 minutes) with good discriminability. This com-
bined assessment is well suited for use with Mechanical
Turk and should also be appropriate for estimating the
wider range of differences in statistical numeracy that ex-
ist in samples of the general population.
3.5 A multiple choice format
In some cases researchers may require more flexibility
than the current Berlin Numeracy Test formats provide.
For example, many psychometric tests are given in a mul-
tiple choice format. Unfortunately, providing potential
answers to participants increases the benefits of guessing.
With four options, guessing would be expected to yield a
score of approximately 25% correct. In contrast, in all
other “fill in the blank” formats of the Berlin Numeracy
Test, the contribution of a guessing parameter is essen-
tially zero. To address this issue, multiple choice test
format development began with an analysis of patterns
of incorrect responses to previous tests from participants
in the aforementioned Mechanical Turk study (n=1612).
For each question, we listed the most frequently given in-
correct options (each recorded in 8–20% of incorrect an-
swers). Then, for each Berlin Numeracy Test question we
included the correct answer, the two most frequent incor-
rect answers, and a “none of the above” option (Appendix
V).
Next, we collected data from participants at the Michi-
gan Technological University (n=269). Participants in-
cluded convenience samples primarily from departments
of Psychology, Mechanical Engineering, and Computer
Science. The majority of participants were undergradu-
ate students, with a small proportion of the sample com-
posed of either graduate students or faculty. Participants
were either sent a link asking them to complete a sur-
vey via internal listservs or tests were administered in
classes. Participants were presented with one of two ver-
sions of the multiple choice format differing only in the
wording of one problem (Appendix V).17 This manipu-
lation was conducted because we received feedback that
some professional groups may be more willing to partici-
17The exact wording of the alternative question is as follows: “Out of
1,000 people in a small town, 500 have a minor genetic mutation. Out of
these 500 who have the genetic mutation, 100 are men. Out of the 500
inhabitants who do not have the genetic mutation, 300 are men. What is
the probability that a randomly drawn man has the genetic mutation?”
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pate if questions seemed related to their areas of expertise
(e.g., some medical doctors will see more face validity in
questions about genetic mutations as compared to choir
membership). Accurate responses to the new (M=.56) v.
old (M=.60) items did not significantly differ χ2 (1) =
.259. Distributions of scores also did not significantly
differ between tests, t(267)=1.383, p=.17, and so data
sets were combined for subsequent analyses. Overall, the
mean multiple choice test score was 55% correct, which
reasonably approximated the ideal score of 50%. Anal-
ysis of distributions of responses indicated the multiple
choice format showed no skew (–.006). Results indicate
that the multiple choice format provided good discrim-
inability and remained well balanced even when used
with highly numerate individuals (e.g., computer science
students).
4 General discussion
Over the last decade, the Schwartz et al. (1997) and Lip-
kus et al. (2001) numeracy tests have proven useful and
sometimes essential for various aspects of theory devel-
opment, as well as for applications in risk communica-
tion. However, as anticipated by Lipkus and colleagues,
in the 10 years since publication of their test, research has
identified a number of limitations and opportunities for
improvement in measures of statistical numeracy. Build-
ing on the work of Lipkus et al. (2001), Schwartz et al.
(1997), and many others (e.g., Peters et al., 2006, 2007b;
Reyna et al., 2009), we have developed a flexible, multi-
format test of statistical numeracy and risk literacy for use
with diverse samples (e.g., highly-educated college grad-
uates from around the world). Next we turn to discussion
of construct validity, underlying cognitive mechanisms,
and emerging applications in adaptive decision support.
4.1 Construct validity, limits, and future di-
rections
The Berlin Numeracy Test specifically measures the
range of statistical numeracy skill that is important for
accurately interpreting and acting on information about
risk—i.e., risk literacy. Our studies showed that a very
short, adaptive numeracy test could provide sound assess-
ment with dramatically improved discriminability across
diverse samples, cultures, education levels, and lan-
guages. Content validity is clear in the types of ques-
tions included in the test—i.e., math questions involv-
ing ratio concepts and probabilities. Convergent validity
was documented by showing high intercorrelations with
other numeracy tests, as well as with other assessments
of general cognitive abilities, cognitive styles, and educa-
tion. Discriminant validity was documented by showing
the test was unrelated to common personality and motiva-
tion measures (e.g., uncorrelated with emotional stability
or extraversion). Criterion validity was documented by
showing that the Berlin Numeracy Test provided unique
predictive validity for evaluating both numeric and non-
numeric information about risks. This unique predictive
validity held when statistically controlling for other nu-
meracy tests and for other general ability and cognitive-
style instruments. Taken together, results converge and
contribute to our evolving understanding of the construct
validity of both numeracy and risk literacy.18
Going forward, more research is needed to document
the causal connections between numeracy, risk literacy
and risky decision making. Theoretically, improving
some types of mathematics skills will improve risk lit-
eracy and risky decision making. However, the evidence
of such benefits along with quantification of the magni-
tudes of these benefits is surprisingly limited (e.g., how
much study time is required to help less numerate indi-
viduals overcome denominator neglect? Does the same
level of training continue to inoculate participants under
conditions of high emotional stress as might be expected
in medical decisions?). As well, despite the utility of cur-
rent theoretical frameworks, our understanding of under-
lying cognitive mechanisms is still somewhat underspeci-
ficed (for discussion see next section). Future studies are
likely to benefit by more closely aligning with current
research in mathematics and general literacy education,
as well as research on mathematics development, mathe-
matics expertise, and training for transfer (Seigler, 1988).
Additionally, there is a need for statistical numeracy tests
that provide larger item pools and parallel forms that can
be administered to the same participants multiple times
without inflating test scores (e.g., limiting item familiar-
ity effects). This option for repeated measurement is nec-
essary for the assessment of developmental changes as-
sociated with skill acquisition. Related test development
efforts are currently underway for the Berlin Numeracy
Test.
It is important to again note that the Berlin Numer-
acy Test is designed specifically for educated and highly-
educated samples (e.g., college students; business, medi-
cal, and legal professionals). Discriminability will be re-
duced when assessing individuals who have lower levels
of educational attainment (e.g., the Berlin Numeracy Test
may show some positive skew in samples of high school
students or among older adults). When this is a concern,
researchers can include an additional instrument such as
the fast three item test by Schwartz et al. (1997). The re-
18According to Cronbach and Meehl’s (1955) review of construct va-
lidity “a construct is some postulated attribute of people, assumed to be
reflected in test performance.” Similarly, contemporary views hold that
construct validity “. . . is not a property of the test or assessment as such,
but rather of the meaning of the test scores” which is established by
integrating and evaluating multiple lines of evidence (Messick, 1995).
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sults of our Mechanical Turk web panel study show that
this strategy can produce excellent discriminability with
virtually no skew, estimating variation among relatively
low and very high ranges of statistical numeracy.
Because the Berlin Numeracy Test provides a broad es-
timate of variation in statistical numeracy and risk liter-
acy it is not able to provide a detailed assessment of spe-
cific differences in numeracy, such as identifying deficits
in reasoning about probability as compared to perform-
ing multiplication. This level of analysis is necessary be-
cause, although risk literacy is a major concern, numer-
acy is important for thinking and general decision making
well beyond its influence on risk comprehension (Peters,
in press). Of note, other factor analytic research by Lib-
erali and colleagues (2011) indicates that, at least with re-
spect to some risky decisions and some judgments, com-
ponent numeracy skills (e.g., multiplication vs. probabil-
ity) can be differentially beneficial.19 We also currently
do not have any theoretical account systematically link-
ing component numeracy skills and competencies with
the many various types of risky decisions people com-
monly face (e.g., retirement planning v. medical screen-
ing decisions, etc.). There is a need for larger scale cogni-
tive process tracing and factor analytic assessments to be
conducted across a wider range of numeracy, risk literacy,
and risky decision making. Initial studies may benefit by
examining relations between established numeracy tests,
component math skills, and other established instruments
such as the advanced decision making competency tests
(Bruine de Bruin, Parker, Fischhoff, 2007; Parker & Fis-
chhoff, 2005).
Future research will also need to use methods that pro-
vide details about the ecological frequencies of problem-
atic risky decisions, including those related to risk lit-
eracy, using techniques such as representative sampling
(Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004). This type of epi-
demiological data could then be used to start to quan-
tify the relative economic, personal, and social impact of
specific weaknesses in numeracy and risk literacy (e.g.,
when and how often does denominator neglect affect
high-stakes vs. lower stakes risky decisions among less
numerate individuals; for a related discussion see Garcia-
Retamero, Okan, & Cokely, in press). This ecologi-
cal approach would provide essential input for relative
prioritization of different interventions (i.e., which kind
of problems do the most harm and which interventions
would provide the greatest benefit; for a recent review
see Reyna et al., 2009). Of course, given the wide in-
fluence of numeracy, analyses will need to be conducted
across and within various domains (medicine vs. finance)
and sub-domains (e.g., retirement planning versus credit
decisions). Because there are many cognitive skills in-
19The factor structures varied across two studies, which complicates
interpretation although the results are suggestive.
volved in statistical numeracy and risk literacy a test of all
component skills may turn out to be prohibitively long,
necessitating the use of more complex adaptive testing
(Thompson & Weiss, 2011). Generally, more compre-
hensive assessments will also need to address the wide
range of cognitive mechanisms that link numeracy, risk
literacy, and decision making.
4.2 Underlying cognitive mechanisms
At its core, numeracy refers to one’s ability to repre-
sent, store, and accurately process mathematical opera-
tions (Peters, in press). As with all complex skills, indi-
vidual differences in numeracy will reflect the interaction
of many cognitive and affective mechanisms that vary by
situation. The recent review by Reyna and colleagues
(2009) provides an overview of some of the causal frame-
works that are used to understand the relationship be-
tween numerical processing and risky decision making.
For example, in the psychophysical tradition, theory em-
phasizes individual differences in the representation of
internal mental magnitudes (e.g., linear v. logarithmic).
In part, differences in risky decisions result from inde-
pendent contributions of both evolved and acquired nu-
merical estimation systems. That is, in part individual
differences in numeracy reflect differences in one’s intu-
itive number sense and the affective meaning issued by
this sense (Peters, in press; Peters et al., 2008; Slovic &
Peters, 2006).
A second framework used to understand the relation
between numeracy and risky decision making draws on
fuzzy trace theory (Reyna, 2004; Reyna & Lloyd, 2006;
Reyna et al., 2009). Following traditions in psycholin-
guistics, fuzzy trace theory explains differences in numer-
ical processing in terms of cognitive representations and
memory. Cognition is said to involve simultaneous en-
coding of verbatim information (“literal facts”) and gist
information (“fuzzy meaning or interpretations”) into two
separable forms of memory. For example, when evaluat-
ing two options with different prices, participants can be
shown to encode both verbatim information (e.g., “op-
tion one costs $25 dollars and option two costs $0”) as
well as gist information (e.g., “the cost is something ver-
sus nothing”). Moreover, theoretically, people have a
fuzzy-processing preference such that responses tend to
be based on one’s gist representation. That is, people tend
to base choices on the fuzziest or the least precise repre-
sentation of numeric information. There is a well devel-
oped literature linking fuzzy trace theory to judgment and
decision making, including a mathematical model that
explains some types of memory illusions and judgment
processes. However, there is currently no validated in-
strument that can be used to assess or predict individual
differences in one’s likelihood of relying on gist versus
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verbatim numeric representations.20
A third framework used to understand numeracy in-
volves computational approaches in the information pro-
cessing tradition of Newell and Simon (1972), and many
others (Anderson, 1982; 1996; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the
ABC Research Group, 1999; Siegler, 1988). A cen-
tral goal of this tradition is the development of precise,
integrative computational models that allow for high-
fidelity cognitive simulations (e.g., ACT-R computational
models; Anderson 1996, Marewski & Mehlhorn, 2011;
Schooler & Hertwig, 2005; see also Katsikopoulos &
Lan, 2011). Accordingly, this tradition relies heavily
on cognitive process tracing studies, including studies
of reaction times, eye-tracking, information search, and
think-aloud protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Schulte-
Mecklenbeck, Kuhberger, & Ranyard, 2011). These
methods provide data on how cognition unfolds over
time, often producing relatively direct evidence about
strategies (e.g., heuristics) and essential mechanisms
(e.g., the influence of an incorrect understanding of math
operations). Cognitive process tracing methods are also
thought to be essential components of test construction
and construct validation (Cronbach & Meehl, 1995; Mes-
sick, 1995). Among other virtues these methods avoid
the perils of making inferences about specific cognitive
processes based on averaged responses. That is, because
participants sometimes use different strategies on differ-
ent trials—and because different people often use differ-
ent strategies—one cannot reliably identify or infer “the”
underlying cognitive strategy because multiple strategies
are at play (Siegler, 1987; see also Cokely & Kelley,
2009).
Although there is a considerable body of experimen-
tal research emphasizing differences in information pro-
cessing, such as differences in analytical versus intuitive
processing,21 there are only a few cognitive process trac-
ing studies on statistical numeracy and its relationship to
risky decision making (Barton, Cokely, Galesic, Koehler,
& Haas, 2009). In one study of decisions in simple
risky lotteries, a retrospective think-aloud protocol analy-
sis was used in combination with assessments of decision
reaction times and decision performance (Cokely & Kel-
ley, 2009).22 Results indicated that numeracy and other
20An instrument is currently in the initial stages of development in
Valerie Reyna’s Lab (personal communication with Valerie Reyna).
21Although generic dual process theory is popular among decision
scientists we do not discuss this framework here as there is concern
about its construct validity. Arguments hold that, although it is a useful
organizational framework, the framework suffers from theoretical and
conceptual under-specification and inconsistency, and as a result lacks
predictive validity (Cokely, 2009; Keren & Schul, 2010; Kruglanski &
Gigerenzer, 2011; Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996; Osman, 2004; Newell,
1973; Reyna et al., 2009). For a brief review of recent debiasing studies
see Milkman, Chugh, and Bazerman, (2009).
22In concurrent verbal protocol analysis participants are asked to ver-
balize their thoughts while performing a task. A meta-analysis indicated
abilities (e.g., working memory) predicted more norma-
tive risky decisions. However, in contrast to theory as-
suming that more normative decisions resulted from more
normative cognitive processes (i.e., calculating expected
value), numeracy was shown to predict more elaborative
encoding and heuristic search (e.g., transforming proba-
bilities, comparing relative magnitudes, and considering
the time required to earn equivalent sums of money). In
turn, the differences in elaborative encoding and search
(e.g., reaction time) were found to fully mediate the re-
lationship between numeracy and superior risky deci-
sion making. Similarly, individuals who score higher on
general cognitive ability measures are known to spend
more time preparing for tasks and more deliberatively
encode task relevant information (Baron, 1978; 1990;
Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Hertzog & Robinson, 2005;
Jaeggi et al., 2011; McNamara & Scott, 2001; Stern-
berg, 1977; Turley-Ames & Whitfield, 2003; Vigneau,
Caissie, & Bors, 2005; Jaeggi et al., 2011; see also Duck-
worth, Quinn, Lynam, Loeber, & Stouthamer-Loeber,
2011). Research shows that elaborative encoding causes
information in working memory to be stored in long-
term memory, thereby freeing-up additional resources
and functionally increasing information processing ca-
pacity (Cokely, Kelley, & Gilchrist, 2006; Unsworth &
Spillers, 2010). Other experimental data also shows that
varying encoding and search causes changes in numerical
processing and decision making performance (Natter &
Berry, 2005; Smith & Windschitl, 2011). However, cog-
nitive abilities such as numeracy do not simply result in
more complex decision algorithms (Broder, 2003; Mata,
Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2007). Rather, cognitive abili-
ties tend to predict more adaptive allocation of limited
cognitive resources, which tends to include more reflec-
tive, careful, and elaborative encoding even when deci-
sions are ultimately based on heuristics (Cokely & Kelley,
2009; see also Broder, 2003; Keller et al., 2010; Mata,
Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2007).
More research is needed to improve theoretical spec-
ification of how and when differences in numeracy will
predict differences in encoding and search. One hypothe-
sis is that higher levels of general abilities, including nu-
meracy, are associated with differences in metacognition,
which enables greater sensitivity to feedback (Mitchum
& Kelley, 2010; see also Flavell, 1979). In turn, better
detection of task feedback can give rise to more adaptive
decision making as participants may become more likely
to exploit cognitive niches (Marewski & Schooler, 2011).
that when used with the standard instructions, and Level 1 data, concur-
rent reports are not reactive, meaning they do not interact with cognitive
processes although they may increase total processing time (Fox et al.
2011). In retrospective protocol analysis participants are asked to ver-
balize their thoughts after a task is complete, which can be less reliable
than concurrent methods, and so converging methods such as reaction
time or eye-tracking are advisable.
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These metacognitive processes likely include a host of
simple heuristics such as (i) double checking, (ii) perfor-
mance predicting, and (iii) searching for disconfirming
evidence—which may be useful components of reflective
thinking (for a detailed theoretical account of reflective
thinking, see Baron, 1985).
The link between abilities and elaborative encoding
may in part explain why including the cognitive reflec-
tion test in our hierarchical model reduced the strength
of the relationship between the Berlin Numeracy Test
and risk comprehension (see validation study one). The
predictive power of the Berlin Numeracy Test may have
decreased because the cognitive reflection test captured
shared-variance owing to differences in encoding and
search. Research in our laboratories has demonstrated
that the cognitive reflection test is sometimes uniquely as-
sociated with differences in information search, predict-
ing differences in encoding, memory, and judgment in
financial estimation tasks (Cokely, Parpart, & Schooler,
2009; in preparation). Factor analytic research by Lib-
erali and colleagues indicates that the cognitive reflec-
tion test loads on a factor that is distinct from numeracy
(Liberali et al., 2011). This cognitive reflection test fac-
tor predicted differences in one’s memory for stimulus
items, which in turn was one of the strongest predictors
of task performance—consistent with an elaborative en-
coding account.
Beyond other mechanisms, knowledge of specific
mathematical operations and rules is at the heart of nu-
meracy (Buttersworth, 2006). Research shows that ma-
jor differences in skill and expert performance primar-
ily reflect differences in knowledge and proceduraliza-
tion of skill caused by differences in deliberate practice
(Anderson, 1996; Ericsson, Charness, Feltovich, & Hoff-
man, 2006; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993).
As with all forms of learning and expertise, skill tends
to be domain-specific and generalizes or transfers only
to the extent that the skill and the new task involve sim-
ilar elements (Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). For ex-
ample, if a participant had an excellent working knowl-
edge of multiplication then other tasks that involve mul-
tiplication would also benefit (e.g., risky decision tasks
that require calculation of expected values). As noted,
recent factor analytic research indicated that both multi-
plication and proportion-comprehension skills accouted
for unique variance when predicting ratio biases and con-
junction/disjunction fallacies (Liberali et al., 2011).
In summary, individual differences in statistical nu-
meracy and risk literacy result from the complex inter-
action of many factors including one’s (1) intuitive num-
ber sense; (2) gist v. verbatim representations; (3) re-
flective and elaborative encoding; and (4) skilled under-
standing of mathematical operations. Moreover, there are
likely many other important factors to consider. For ex-
ample, the initial validation study for the Berlin Numer-
acy Test indicated that test anxiety was another factor that
can be negatively related to test performance. We spec-
ulate that in some cases anxiety may reduce motivation
to engage in elaborative encoding of numerical informa-
tion, limiting one’s willingness to practice and develop
one’s skills. However, other individuals who do not ex-
perience anxiety may instead experience higher levels of
affective meaning from numbers which could inspire fur-
ther encoding, reflection, and learning. In turn, greater
levels of elaborative encoding and knowledge may lead
to richer and more contextualized (if still imprecise) gist
based representations and reasoning. Further research
is needed to disentangle and map the interplay of these
factors in close connection with specific task characteris-
tics.23
5 Conclusions
We make sense of our complex and uncertain world
with data about risks that are presented in terms of ratio
concepts such as probabilities, proportions, and percent-
ages. Whether patients, consumers, and policy-makers
correctly understand these risks—i.e., whether or not they
are risk literate—depends in part on their statistical nu-
meracy (see Lipkus et al., 2010 for a recent example in
medicine). Rather than develop a long or comprehensive
test assessing a wide-range of statistical numeracy skills,
our efforts here focused on developing a fast test of statis-
tical numeracy that leveraged available computing tech-
nology and internet accessibility (e.g., online data collec-
tion and scoring; accessible via smart phones and other
internet ready devices). We believe this type of technol-
ogy integration with psychometric refinement is timely
given the growing need for assessment of factors that in-
teract with risky decision-making in basic and applied do-
mains (Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Lipkus & Peters, 2009;
Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 2010; Garcia-Retamero &
Cokely, in press; Peters et al., 2006; Reyna et al., 2011).
Looking forward, there are many emerging opportu-
nities to use this and other validated tests to enhance
adaptive decision support systems (i.e., custom-tailored
risk communication; Lipkus et al., 2010). For exam-
ple, waiting patients or new employees selecting bene-
fits might answer a couple of questions on a tablet com-
puter in order to notify professionals about the appropri-
ate level of subsequent risk discourse necessary for in-
formed decision making. Similarly, following a diagnosis
23The information processing tradition typically takes a “systems”
perspective recognizing the importance of the interaction between task
environments and the computational capabilities of the actor (Simon,
1990). In other words, cognitive performance is the product of the in-
teraction of persons, processes, and task environments (Cokely & Feltz,
2009a; 2009b; Cokely & Kelley, 2009).
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of certain diseases or the introduction of new technolo-
gies, interactive information brochures could be accessed
online with custom-tailored information adaptively de-
livered according to one’s level of risk literacy. These
instruments hold the promise of not only helping facili-
tate risk communication but they may also be important
for mitigating legal and ethical concerns. An appropri-
ate risk literacy test could provide additional evidence
that people who are considering loans or elective surg-
eries have sufficient numeracy to interpret the risks in the
formats that are presented. Of course, there are several
promising simple solutions for transparent risk commu-
nication like visual aids and natural frequencies that are
widely understandable and should be used when practical
(Galesic, Garcia-Retamero, & Gigerenzer, 2009; Garcia-
Retamero & Cokely, 2011; Garcia-Retamero et al., in
press; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). Nevertheless, one
size cannot fit all—different situations will sometimes re-
quire different thresholds of numeracy and risk literacy
for accurate understanding and informed decision mak-
ing (Chapman & Lui, 2009; Gaissmaier et al., 2011).
Beyond applications in risk communication and adap-
tive decision support, adaptive tests like the Berlin Nu-
meracy Test may also find use in selecting appropriate
interactive tutorials for learning about risk literacy itself.
Using adaptive tests can quickly get students to ability-
appropriate examples of common errors in risk interpre-
tation (e.g., confusing relative and absolute risk formats).
In these cases, tests could help ensure that tutorials are
not too hard or too easy, and may limit boredom and frus-
tration. Given the importance of statistical numeracy for
economic prosperity and informed citizenship even mod-
est educational benefits may confer considerable valu-
able. Research on all these topics is ongoing in our lab-
oratories along with efforts to develop other similar fast,
adaptive tests (e.g., graph literacy, knowledge of sexual
health risks, nutritional knowledge). Across all these
endeavors, development and applications should adhere
to standards for educational and psychological testing
(1999). As new tools, interactive activities, and improved
tests become available they will be added to the content
on www.riskliteracy.org (see also Appelt, Milch, Hand-
graaf, & Weber, 2011; http://www.sjdm.org/dmidi).
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Appendix I: Example of everyday
risky decision-making
Weather forecasting (from Gigerenzer, Her-
twig, van den Broek, Fasolo, & Katsikopou-
los, 2005)
Imagine there is a 30% chance of rain tomorrow. Please
indicate which of the following alternatives is the most
appropriate interpretation of the forecast.
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1. It will rain tomorrow in 30% of the region.
2. It will rain tomorrow for 30% of the time.
3. It will rain on 30% of the days like tomorrow.
The correct answer is (3).
Example 2: Everyday risky decision-making
Zendil–Gum Inflammation (from Garcia-Retamero &
Galesic, in press)
Imagine that you see the following advertisement for a
new toothpaste:
Zendil—50% reduction in occurrence of gum inflam-
mation. Zendil is a new toothpaste to prevent gum inflam-
mation. Half as many people who used Zendil developed
gum inflammation when compared to people using a dif-
ferent toothpaste.
Which one of the following would best help you evalu-
ate how much a person could benefit from using Zendil?
1. The risk of gum inflammation for people who do not
use Zendil
2. The risk of gum inflammation for people who use a
different brand of toothpaste for the same purpose
3. How many people there were in the group who used
a different toothpaste
4. How old the people who participated in the study
were
5. How much a weekly supply of Zendil costs
6. Whether Zendil has been recommended by a den-
tists’ association for this use
The correct answer is (1).
Appendix II: Adaptive Berlin Nu-
meracy Test format
Go to www.riskliteracy.org for a unique link to a secure
adaptive test that can be embedded in your experiment
and will automatically score responses. Alternatively,
you can program your own adaptive test as follows:
Instructions: Please answer the questions that follow.
Do not use a calculator but feel free to use the scratch
paper for notes.
[See Figure 1 for adaptive test structure.]
1. Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are mem-
bers of a choir. Out of these 500 members in the
choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that
are not in the choir 300 are men. What is the prob-
ability that a randomly drawn man is a member of
the choir? Please indicate the probability in percent.
______ %
2a. Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times.
On average, out of these 50 throws how many times
would this five-sided die show an odd number (1, 3
or 5)? ______ out of 50 throws.
2b. Imagine we are throwing a loaded die (6 sides). The
probability that the die shows a 6 is twice as high as
the probability of each of the other numbers. On
average, out of these 70 throws how many times
would the die show the number 6? ________out of
70 throws.
3. In a forest 20% of mushrooms are red, 50% brown
and 30% white. A red mushroom is poisonous with
a probability of 20%. A mushroom that is not red
is poisonous with a probability of 5%. What is the
probability that a poisonous mushroom in the forest
is red? ________
Scoring = Based on answers to 2-3 questions following
the adaptive structure.
Correct answers are as follows: 1 = 25; 2a = 30; 2b =
20; 4 = 50.
Appendix III: Berlin Numeracy Test
traditional paper and pencil format
Instructions: Please answer the questions below. Do not
use a calculator but feel free to use the space available for
notes (i.e., scratch paper).
1. Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times.
On average, out of these 50 throws how many times
would this five-sided die show an odd number (1, 3
or 5)? ________ out of 50 throws.
2. Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are mem-
bers of a choir. Out of these 500 members in the
choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that
are not in the choir 300 are men. What is the proba-
bility that a randomly drawn man is a member of the
choir? (please indicate the probability in percent).
___________ %
3. Imagine we are throwing a loaded die (6 sides). The
probability that the die shows a 6 is twice as high
as the probability of each of the other numbers. On
average, out of these 70 throws, how many times
would the die show the number 6? ___________
out of 70 throws.
4. In a forest 20% of mushrooms are red, 50% brown
and 30% white. A red mushroom is poisonous with
a probability of 20%. A mushroom that is not red
is poisonous with a probability of 5%. What is the
probability that a poisonous mushroom in the forest
is red? _____________%
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Scoring = Count total number of correct answers.
Correct answers are as follows: 1 = 30; 2 = 25; 3 = 20;
4 = 50.
Appendix IV: Berlin Numeracy Test
single item (median) format
Instructions: Please answer the questions below. Do not
use a calculator but feel free to use the space available for
notes (i.e., scratch paper).
1. Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are mem-
bers of a choir. Out of these 500 members in the
choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that
are not in the choir 300 are men. What is the proba-
bility that a randomly drawn man is a member of the
choir? (please indicate the probability in percent).
___________ %
Scoring = Count total number of correct answers.
Correct answers are as follows: 1 = 25.
Appendix V: Berlin Numeracy Test
multiple choice format
Instructions: Please answer the questions below. Do not
use a calculator but feel free to use the space available for
notes (i.e., scratch paper).
1. Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times.
On average, out of these 50 throws how many times
would this five-sided die show an odd number (1, 3
or 5)
a) 5 out of 50 throws
b) 25 out of 50 throws
c) 30 out of 50 throws
d) None of the above
2. Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are mem-
bers of a choir. Out of these 500 members in the
choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that
are not in the choir 300 are men. What is the proba-
bility that a randomly drawn man is a member of the




d) None of the above
3. Imagine we are throwing a loaded die (6 sides). The
probability that the die shows a 6 is twice as high
as the probability of each of the other numbers. On
average, out of these 70 throws, about how many
times would the die show the number 6?
a) 20 out of 70 throws
b) 23 out of 70 throws
c) 35 out of 70 throws
d) None of the above
4. In a forest 20% of mushrooms are red, 50% brown
and 30% white. A red mushroom is poisonous with
a probability of 20%. A mushroom that is not red
is poisonous with a probability of 5%. What is the





d) None of the above
Scoring = Count total number of correct answers.
Correct answers are: 1 = c; 2 = b; 3 = a; 4 = c.
